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Abstract 
Through several conduits, sound institutional quality is pivotal for economic 
development, as there is evidence that stable democratic institutions, rule of law 
and sound governance structures in the administration are highly conducive to 
promote growth. Therefore, a high institutional quality is not only the end point, but 
also the starting point of a more sustainable development. In this paper we provide 
some theoretical considerations as well as empirical evidence, based on several 
regression analyses, that the quality of institutions in a wider sense, and 
governance, which includes not only the level of “politics” itself, but also the 
administrative level, is relevant not only for the macro-level of development (i.e. the 
increase of the national welfare and foreign investment), but also on a micro-level: 
A stronger participation of private enterprises in public service provision and the 
introduction of public-private partnerships depends to a high degree on the 
institutional quality. This is even more relevant as the improvement of public 
services and of core infrastructures can be seen as crucial multipliers for future 
growth.  
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In several ways, institutional quality is pivotal for economic development. There is 
much evidence that democratic institutions, the absence of corruption, rule of law, 
and sound governance structures in the country’s administration are conducive to 
promoting growth in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or to attracting 
foreign direct investment (FDI), to mention just some of its most relevant 
determinants (see for the discussion of the role of institutions e.g. Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012). Democratic governance and accountability are not the end point 
after a country has undergone economic and social development, but rather the 
start point of a more sustainable development. 
In our paper, we provide some theoretical insights as well as empirical evidence 
that the quality of institutions, which includes not only the level of “political 
institutions” itself, but also the administrative level, is relevant not only for achieving 
the standard macro-level development objectives (e.g. the increase of GDP and 
FDI). Also on the micro-level – the provision of infrastructure and other public 
services – institutions matter. In other words, a stronger participation of private 
enterprises in service provision and the introduction of public-private partnerships 
depend to a high degree on the institutional quality of a country. This is even more 
relevant as the improvement of public services and of core infrastructures can be 
seen as a multiplier for further growth, as theoretical considerations and a 
substantial number of empirical studies have clearly demonstrated. (Efficient) 
Investment in public services and infrastructure provides positive growth impulses 
for the overall economy by fostering entrepreneurship, providing necessary 
infrastructure for businesses or sending signals to foreign investors (for an 
overview e.g. Hartwig, 2005). Therefore, as conventional wisdom has it, given that 
private firms may provide much-needed financial resources as well as superior 
management know-how and technical expertise for infrastructure provision and 
public services, the stronger inclusion of private enterprises may be one very 
promising development “tool” (e.g. Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; Ziekow, 2003). The 
important role of private enterprises can play in the provision of infrastructure and 
services is in particular given for all countries that face severe budget constraints in 
the public sector. While this applies generally to less developed countries, 
industrialised countries in Europe and the US also face increasing public budget 
restrictions, triggered not least by the financial crisis of 2008/2009.  
Therefore, as the general effect of institutions on the overall economic wellbeing of 
a country or economic growth rates has been subject to scientific research before 
(e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Obinger, 2001; Wagener, 2004), our 
contribution to the existing literature is new in two dimensions. By analysing the 
“micro-level” of development, focusing on private sector participation, for the first 
time we provide empirical evidence in how far institutional quality influences the 
involvement of private firms in the provision of public services. Additionally, by tying 
the link between institutional quality and the nature of private sector participation, 
we contribute to the ongoing debate in particular on transaction costs related to 
private sector participation and public-private partnerships. 
Our paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we first apply the theory of 
“new institutional economics” to explain why sound governance, especially the 
quality of bureaucracy, and not least of regulatory oversight, and of anti-corruption 
policies, is a crucial factor in fostering a potentially welfare-increasing stronger 
inclusion of the private sector. Transaction costs are of specific relevance in this 
context, as it is reasonable to assume higher transaction costs will, ceteris paribus, 
always increase the price of cooperations and partnerships (assuming that 
transaction costs are an integral part of the full costs of contract conclusion and 
contract enforcement) (Hart, 2005). Based on this, we discuss the economics of 
private sector involvement more detailed, with a specific focus again on the role of 
transaction costs. 
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After setting up the theoretical framework, we will provide some empirical evidence 
for the role sound institutions play in the context of the establishment of public-
private partnerships in infrastructure provision, focusing on a view to the world’s 
less developed countries. We will finish our analysis with a brief conclusion of our 
main findings and some policy recommendations.  
Theoretical background: “new institutional 
economics” and the “economics of private sector 
participation”  
Key insights from the “new institutional economics” 
The main hypothesis of institutional economics is that institutions strongly influence 
human behaviour and therefore also have a strong relevance for the growth and 
development of countries (or lack thereof) (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; 
Obinger, 2001). While an exclusive and universally accepted definition of 
institutions is still missing, a rather broad consensus has emerged in the literature 
on what constitutes institutions and what their principal functions and effects are 
(for a comprehensive overview see Hodgson, 1998 and Williamson, 2000). 
Following North (1991 and 1992), institutions are interpreted as ‘humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions’ (North, 1991). 
They constitute the framework of a society, which to a high degree determines the 
individuals’ activities by providing crucial information and therefore reducing 
uncertainty (Voigt, 2002). This framework does not only comprise the so-called 
material institutions, but also all mechanisms that are able to enforce these very 
institutions (Erlei et al., 2007). 
In particular, institutions that determine the rules of the game and shape 
governance structures are the focus of NIE and the quantitative approaches that 
are applied in this context. Institutions at these levels are often seen as vital 
determinants for economic wealth/welfare (or the lack thereof). At the same time it 
is relatively easy to identify – in a normative, theory-based approach – how these 
institutions should be structured to reach the overall goal of “economic growth” and 
the intermediate goal of “good governance” as a necessary precondition for 
achieving economic wealth/welfare. 
The role of institutions is of specific importance in a setting of incomplete 
information and uncertainty, as is inevitably – due to prohibitive costs of gathering 
and processing information – the case in every real-world economic system. 
Incomplete information or asymmetric information between actors, as well as 
bounded rationality and the – by nature – limited mental capacities of human 
beings lead to additional costs, the so-called “transaction costs” (e.g. Coase, 
1937). Transaction costs relate to each single market and non-market transaction, 
may it be with regard to goods or services, or, in what constitutes a broader 
application of this concept, to the definition, transfer and enforcement of property 
rights (Richter and Furubotn, 1999). These costs arise due to the fact that in order 
to perform any of these transactions information on potential counterparts has to be 
obtained, checked for correctness and assessed in terms of counterparty and other 
forms of economic risks, and that, eventually, contracts have to be negotiated, 
monitored and, if necessary, enforced or renegotiated. Transaction costs therefore 
occur both ex ante, i.e. before a contract is created, and ex post, after the 
contractual arrangements have been finalised. 
Effective and generally respected institutions can help to reduce – though they will 
never completely eliminate – these transaction costs in several ways by providing 
some crucial information and some kind of security in an overall framework which 
is unavoidably characterised by uncertainty about future developments in an 
essentially unpredictable, dynamic, evolutionary world. The greater degree of 
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certainty that the contractual partner will heed the contract provisions will, in turn, 
enhance the incentives (for individuals and enterprises alike) to engage in a 
contract in the first place because of the much reduced risks of falling into “hidden 
traps”. In other words, the knowledge itself that one is in the legal position to take a 
case to court or mediation (e.g. in case of the counterparty’s real or alleged breach 
of contract or for unforeseen renegotiations within the contract duration) will tend to 
discourage each contract party from acting opportunistically or in outright breach of 
contract, as this will give rise to substantial costs (including loss of reputational 
capital etc.). A strong legal system which provides for effective sanctions will 
therefore be substantially conducive to contract compliance. It will, in turn, lower 
transaction costs for contractual arrangements in the first place, resulting in more 
transactions occurring, and, ceteris paribus, in the welfare-enhancing productivity 
gains which can be harnessed through from the widening and deepening of the 
division of labour. This is primarily due to the beneficial effect of lower individual 
costs of control which stem from the existence of efficient institutions which at least 
partly even out the information asymmetry between (potential and actual) 
contractual partners. To sum up, in this context, a crucial function of (good) 
institutions is their signaling to act as stand-ins for the contract partner’s 
trustworthiness and reliability. 
For efficiently and effectively fulfilling these functions, good institutions can be 
regarded as a conditio sine qua non for economic development and a sound long-
run economic performance of a country (e.g. recently Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2012; see also Apolte, 2004; North, 1991; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Wagener, 
2004). As Klein and Luu (2003) state, “[a] key to understanding economic 
development, then, is institutional development”. Consequently, within the last few 
decades, a whole new branch of literature endeavoured not only to provide for the 
deeper theoretical understanding of the relevance of institutions, but also to seek 
robust empirical evidence on the impact of the institutional framework for 
development.  
Most of these empirical studies measure the impact of institutional quality on the 
economic wealth/welfare of a country, commonly measured in terms of Gross 
National Product (GNP) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures (per head in 
US$ and/or based on purchasing power parities), or the rate of change of these 
indicators, or use different proxies for economic wealth/welfare. “Institutional 
quality” in these studies is defined in different ways, and not exclusively as the 
absence of corruption, good regulatory quality, democratic participation and high 
accountability of the government, political stability, the secure property rights, 
and/or efficient public administration. To recapitulate here the main results of an 
meta-assessment of several seminal empirical studies, independent of their 
respective definition (and the data sets) used, it can be safely concluded that there 
is substantial evidence for a significant positive correlation between (high) 
institutional quality and (positive) rates of economic growth and/or wealth. As, for 
instance, Obinger (2001) is able to show, while the regime-type itself (democracy 
vs. dictatorship) does not show a significant curvilinear influence, sound institutions 
– in the sense of the absence of corruption or a high quality level of the 
administration – have a significant positive effect on economic growth. 
Furthermore, and often linked to an overall sound institutional framework, there is 
some evidence that in the long run especially democratic regimes experience a 
high level of wealth (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).  
Klein and Luu (2003) do not focus directly on GDP/GNI data, but on productivity 
trends in a country, and were able to show that differences in technical efficiency in 
a country sample can be explained by the specific institutional framework.  
In our own analysis, focusing not on the macro-, but on the micro-level, we assume 
that (good) institutions are important for economic growth as they facilitate private-
sector investments in infrastructure and the private sectors contributions to public 
services. Good institutions provide reliable signals for the private sector to invest, 
European Journal of Government and Economics 3(2) 
108 
 
as contracts can be secured without prohibitively high transaction costs. If the 
administration works efficiently, is not corrupt, and transparency as well as 
reliability on existing contracts can be assumed to be given, it is much more likely 
that private partners will invest in joint projects, which may result in a better supply 
of public goods and infrastructure, and therewith in the long run higher economic 
growth. This is even more important as contracts between the public and the 
private sector in its different forms arise within the context of incomplete 
information and uncertainty (Parker and Hartley, 2005). These contracts are 
“necessarily incomplete“ (Erlei et al., 2007). Not all future developments and 
contingencies can be foreseen by the contract parties, let alone fixed by adequate 
contract provisions  ̶  a fact further compounded by the bounded rationality of the 
prospective partners, which could result in future opportunistic behaviour from 
either side (Coase, 1937 and Williamson, 1975/1985). Transaction costs are the 
logical result of this incompleteness and play a pivotal role for the successful or 
unsuccessful initiation and longer-term implementation of partnerships (Klein et al., 
1996). To be more specific, transaction costs in these partnerships include ex ante 
the costs of the bidding process, negotiations and the establishment as well as ex 
post costs for re-negotiations and compliance (Dudkin and Välilä, 2005). 
Especially for the private partner the reduction of transaction costs may be 
decisive: A profit-oriented enterprise will invest in public services only if the 
anticipated profit will at least cover its costs (plus yield a “reasonable” rate of return 
on its investment). With transaction costs often being a large percentage of the full 
project costs, excessive transaction costs may render the whole project 
unprofitable as a result. A decrease of the (anticipated) transaction costs therefore 
will likely enhance the probability that contracts conducive to development between 
the public and the private partner will be realised in the first place.  
Another important role of institutions in the context of PPPs lies in the signal they 
send out to (international) development organisations: Many projects related to 
development-driven investment in public services and infrastructure are assisted by 
these development agencies financially, technically and/or through management 
support (Hammami et al., 2006). In detail, the assistance typically takes place in 
specific technical support and investment loans as well as through guarantees 
against political risk, currency risk and (partly) credit risk. This assistance – as well 
as “conventional” development aid – is usually linked to “good governance” in the 
meaning of existing democratic structures, the adherence to human rights and the 
rule of law as well as the existence of (effective) anti-corruption measures 
(Nuscheler, 2005). By having established sound institutions, a necessary 
precondition is therefore fulfilled for the public partner to gain direct access to 
additional funding for the project from international donors. Moreover, for the 
private partner this also increases the likelihood to obtain financial support or 
specific warranties from development agencies – a fact which seems to be very 
important due the high risks of a partnership and/or for the enterprise. Political risks 
like expropriation or civil unrest, substantial exchange rate risks and additional risks 
of doing business may then be covered by the development agencies’ warranties, 
so the availability (or lack thereof) of some independent outside protection against 
said risks seems to bear potentially strong influence a private sector company’s 
penchant to engage in a project.  
Additionally, the existence of sound institutions can be seen as a proxy for a 
government's reputation and stability and, as a result, will prove helpful in attracting 
more private enterprise activity in that country. This is even more important as any 
incomplete contract – as outlined above – is inevitably linked to high transaction 
costs, which, however, can be effectively lowered by mutual trust between the 
potential partners. Every credible signal of a government’s trustworthiness will 
allow more such partnerships to come to fruition. Summarised, “PPPs cannot be 
found in areas where institutional failure and governance gaps are exceptionally 
pronounced” (Schäferhoff et al., 2007: 10). 
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The economics of private sector involvement in public goods 
and infrastructure provision 
Due to shrinking tax revenues, or rising governmental expenditures (i.e. for social 
security), or a combination of both, more and more state and local governments 
face severe budgetary restraints. Accordingly, there is a global trend for 
governments trying to improve their fiscal stance, especially on the expenditure 
side. At the same time, on the grounds of demographic change as well as resulting 
from economic growth, the pressure on public goods, particularly on existing infra-
structures is raising.1 The situation is even more exigent in the less developed 
parts of the world. Still rising rates of urbanisation, high rates of population growth 
and rising standards of living have for years increased the stress on public services 
and infrastructure to the point where demand greatly exceeds supply.   
Private investment, or as a broader concept, private sector involvement can be 
assumed to be one potential solution for the problems outlined above. This invest-
ment can take place in different guises – as full or in-part privatisation, or as joint 
projects in the form of public-private partnerships (PPP) between the public 
administration and private enterprises, especially international companies.  
As privatisation may not be the first best solution from an economic theory 
perspective as far as public goods – i.e. market failure – are concerned or if the 
privatisation process might result in merely swapping a state-run for a private 
monopoly, alternative forms of public-private partnerships exist which may ensure 
adequate control rights for the public sector over the crucial aspects of service 
provision. Many of these “new” partnership models are still lacking a precise 
definition (Budäus and Grüb, 2007). Therefore, in this paper, we use the term 
public-private partnerships for a whole portfolio of different partnership models 
which range from full ownership by the public sector to material privatisation 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). The prevalent definitions of PPP typically focus either 
on the players involved or on procedural aspects of these partnerships. Linder 
(1999) broadly defines the term PPP as ‘rubric for describing cooperative ventures 
between the state and private business’. Grimsey and Lewis (2005) see PPPs as 
‘arrangements whereby private parties participate in, or provide support for, the 
provision of infrastructure, and a PPP project results in a contract for a private 
entity to deliver public infrastructure-based services’. Ziekow (2003), by contrast, 
defines PPP more broadly as the junction of rationalities of actors relevant for 
action, and therewith refers to the, probably, most important factor in the decision 
whether or not to pursue a PPP: the interest of both partners.  
Regardless of the specific form it may take in practice, any PPP-type contractual 
agreement between a private company and the public sector – whether at the state 
or at the municipal level – is typically characterised by a risk-sharing arrangement 
with the private partner taking over (at least some) financial responsibility. The 
duration of PPP projects varies between one and thirty years, with mere service 
and management contracts being of relatively short-term duration, while PPP 
designs which include the construction of an asset and which are refinanced by 
user fees are usually based on longer contract durations so as to ensure full cost 
recovery for the private partner. The commercial risk of failure is mainly borne by 
the public sector in (short-term) projects that do not affect the ownership of the 
asset (which remains with the public sector). In PPP where a direct contact 
between the private company and the customer/user exists (i.e. concessions and 
Build-Operate-Transfer/Build-Own-Operate/Build-Own-Operate-Transfer PPP 
variants), the private partner has to shoulder the main portion of the commercial 
                                                                                                         
1 This paper covers – in line with the World Bank’s definition of infrastructure – telecommunications, 
transport, energy and water supply/sanitation infrastructures. 
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risk, e.g. deficits in payments, because of the high upfront costs he must refinance 
over extended periods of time.  
The expectations related to the socio-economic outcomes of PPP differ 
substantially among participants and stakeholders, but are usually very high among 
all participants compared to their assessment (or perception) of the outcomes the 
institutional status quo ante. The public partner focuses on its need to procure 
additional capital as well as to attract managerial competences and technical skills 
– which are of special relevance in the case of technologically complex 
infrastructures like water supply, sewage systems, energy, and 
telecommunications – without losing the political control over infrastructure 
provision. On the contrary, the private company the profit motive is the dominant 
one (Hammami et al., 2006). In addition to maximizing its profit in the specific 
projects at stake, the private partner typically pursues a long-term, strategic goal, 
tool. To gain at least indirect access, by committing to a specific PPP in a specific 
country, to a market which is not open for full privatisation (yet) – an investment, in 
turn, in a potential first mover advantage in the eventuality of a later privatisation 
(provided the company has gained a reputation as a dependable and fair partner in 
the PPP period). Moreover, the likelihood of winning future tenders for similar PPP 
projects in other countries will increase with the specific knowledge gained. 
Additionally, with the related concepts of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
stakeholder activism becoming more and more relevant for multinational 
companies, in some special cases the decision to enter into a PPP project may not 
exclusively follow a short-term profit maximisation motive (narrowly defined). It may 
rather be intended as a signal of a high(er) degree of stakeholder orientation to 
customers, the public, the media, governments and NGOs from all countries where 
the company is doing business (UNIDO, 2002). In other words, under such 
circumstances a PPP activity may convince the public partner of the company’s 
goodwill and may accordingly have influence on considering the company of being 
the government’s preferred partner in future (case-by-case) decisions on upcoming 
PPP projects or privatisation programmes – thereby giving rise to another first 
mover advantage by raising potential rivals’ costs of market entry.  
Beyond the interests of the public and private partner, a third party, the 
(international) organisations engaged in development cooperation like the World 
Bank have a specific self-interest in boosting PPP. The emergence of new 
challenges in development cooperation, e.g. “nation building” in failed states like 
Afghanistan and Somalia, rises additional tasks, and the budgets of international 
development agencies are not keeping up with their steadily growing expenditures 
requirements. A stronger involvement of the private sector, especially in expensive 
and technologically complex infrastructure provision, may positively contribute to 
narrowing or even closing that gap and may also enhance the – so far often 
dubious – quality of the assistance (Moyo, 2009 and Schäferhoff et al., 2007). 
The potentially pivotal role of private enterprise in promoting economic develop-
ment has therefore rightly been highlighted by key institutions of development 
cooperation, e.g. in the United Nations’ “Global Compact”, which has been 
established to involve the private sector (Annan, 1999). Even the declaration of the 
United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals emphasises the crucial role of 
private companies as stakeholders in development cooperation to achieve a 
substantial reduction of global poverty by 2015. 
As a consequence, more and more PPPs have emerged in developing countries, 
and it appears from anecdotal evidence as if the peak has not been reached yet, 
despite comprehensive data still lacking. But from the number of PPP in 
infrastructure projects which is a good proxy for overall private-sector investment in 
public services, we can observe an increase of both the investment volume itself 
and the sheer numbers in all regions worldwide since the 1990s. Also additional 
projects in countries which had not been covered before have been implemented in 
Schomaker ● Institutional quality and private sector participation 
111 
 
the last decade (World Bank PPI Data Base).2 In many developing countries, the 
political and public awareness of their potential merits as a toll on development 
strategies is rising. Political initiatives like “national strategies” and specific 
ministries have been established to integrate more private partners in the provision 
of public goods and infrastructure, and more efficiently and effectively (Smith et al., 
1997).  
Model and results 
Model and variables 
One of the main challenges in testing the impact of “good governance” or “insti-
tutional quality” in private sector involvement is not only to define what a “sound” or 
“good” institution” is, but also how to adequately operationalise the concept of 
“institutional quality” for quantitative research. Several issues have to be addressed 
and solved, with the conceptual difference between the material institution itself 
(the content dimension) and the question whether this institution is also truly 
enforced (or perceived to be) (the trust dimension) being of pivotal importance 
(Voigt, 2002).  
Generally speaking, the assessment of public policy or public institutions as well as 
the assessments of the public administration is built on a limited selection of 
indicators. As for the political level, accountability and democratic structures are 
popular variables, while for the administrative level, effectiveness of the 
bureaucracy or control of corruption are often utilised. This approach in many 
cases may be misleading, as e.g. the selection/composition of indicators may be 
biased by the research design or data-availability, or the comparability of different 
administrations may not be given (see Van de Walle, 2006). Consequently, a 
number of different indicators and measurement methods are used in the 
respective economic, administrative or political science literature. There is a 
number of arguments against or in favour of using a specific indicator, depending 
on the goal and/or range of the respective work (see for the discussion in detail e.g. 
Bovaird and Löffler (2003) or Van de Walle (2006). As for our study, many of these 
popular indicators are either too specific, as they focus on the output or outcome of 
the bureaucracy, too wide (focusing on the general business environment or the 
political system), or do not cover the necessary range of countries which are 
included in our empirical assessment. 
Another problem which arises in this context is the question of how to get 
information on the institutional quality. In many cases the quality cannot be 
observed directly, so sophisticated extrapolations or estimates have to be applied. 
Another option is measuring the perception of institutional quality among citizens, 
officials and companies. Using this method, the construction of the indicator relies 
on different peoples’ evaluation of one reality, but there is no guarantee that these 
evaluations truly reflect reality, or are at least remotely representative. It is 
therefore safe to assume that there is always a bias, not least as the people who 
were interviewed may have an own interest in a specific outcome so that they 
attempt to create a systematic bias by their willfully deceptive answers. A further 
possibility is that the bias occurs by accident, but remains unnoticed. This is 
particularly true in cases where different people are asked, who are subject 
themselves to an unequal bias due to their deviating respective interests, their 
different abilities to judge and intellectual capabilities. This simple example is 
suitable to document the main problem in the construction of reliable indicators on 
                                                                                                         
2 A PPP is “established” – according to the World Bank’s definition – once the respective project has 
reached the stage of contractual or financial closure, irrespective of later modifications in the contract or 
a complete failure of the PPP. 
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institutional quality, and could be easily extended to cover a broad range of other 
governance indicators as well. 
Additionally, even where a quantitative approach to constructing indicators can be 
reasonably applied, as for those indicators or their components no (substantial) 
measurement problems on the country level exist (e.g. regarding the number of 
patents), the questions remain how reliable these statistics really are and whether 
the pertinent national data are comparable across countries.  
Another caveat results from the fact that there may be no significant difference with 
respect to outcomes between those cases where the institution itself is identified as 
“weak” and those other cases where it is just being perceived as being weak by the 
actors involved, like enterprises or individuals. In this case, there may be another 
specific kind of bias: The sheer existence of an institution may lead to the (factually 
erroneous) subjective judgment that institutional quality is good without 
interviewees taking into consideration that in reality the institutional quality is 
indeed bad. An example might be the inability to properly enforce the – formally 
existing – institution, for instance for a chronic failure to protect (intellectual) 
property rights where the existence of a law does not mean that violators are 
actually prosecuted and/or adequately punished for their infringements. 
But, despite of the manifold analytical limitation outlined above, using a 
combination of these disaggregated indicators does, in our view, provide an 
acceptable – for being broad-based – approach to measure institutional quality, 
without losing too much information due to too much aggregation. Therefore, we 
hold that the set of governance indicators generated by Kaufmann et al (2008), 
which measure the perception of the quality of different institutions in all countries 
worldwide, are an appropriate tool to measure the quality of institutions for the 
purposes of our study.  Originally we planned to use the full set of institutional 
variables (Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, 
Control of Corruption, Political Stability, Regulatory Quality), as provided by 
Kaufmann et al. Additionally, variables like population size, inflation and the gross 
national income (GNI) per capita per year, and regional dummies which we 
consider as exogenous and which we use to control for other effects have been 
tested for. The choice of the variables is in full conformity with our theoretical con-
siderations above: the variable Voice and Accountability influences the involvement 
(financial and/or technical) of international development agencies due to political 
and economic conditionality, the indicators Political Stability and Government 
Effectiveness function as a signal for the potential private partner of how risky a 
commitment might become, of how high the credibility of the government and the 
administration is and of how efficiently the public services work. The absence of 
corruption or at least a strong Control of Corruption gives a signal on the 
presumable transaction costs, and the indicator Regulatory Quality provides 
information on the regulatory framework which determines (especially in naturally 
monopolistic infrastructures like water supply) the day-to-day operation of the PPP.  
Testing the exogenous institutional variables for multicollinearity, we found 
coefficients near 1 for the indicators Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, Political 
Stability, Regulatory Quality and Government Effectiveness. Owing to the high 
correlation between these indicators and the probable endogeneity induced by the 
latter we decided to remove the indicators Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, 
Political Stability and Regulatory Quality because some of the determinants 
covered by these indicators may be assumed to be also covered by the two 
remaining ones. To be more precise, a high quality of public services normally 
means that the administration is not corrupt, rule of law is given and an overall 
quality of political regulation can be assumed as being given. To include both 
relevant institutions, the quality of the administrative institutions as well as the 
political institutions, we use the indicator Government Effectiveness, which proxies 
for the overall quality of the public administration, while Voice and Accountability 
proxies for the existence of a stable democracy. 




Government Effectiveness (GE): This indicator measures the “perceptions of the 
public services’ quality, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies” (Kaufmann et al., 2008). 
Voice and Accountability (VA): This indicator measures the “perceptions of the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media” (Kaufmann et al., 2008). 
According to the theory of institutional economics, our hypothesis is that the 
incidence of private sector investment and PPP projects in a country may strongly 
depend on the quality of local institutions. Private-sector investment in public 
services and infrastructure or partnership regimes between the private and the 
public sector on the micro-level, as outlined above, comprise several different 
governance regimes concerning the key elements project duration, organisational 
structure, and “quality” of the risk-sharing and/or the control rights for the public 
administration. As data on the overall volume of private investment on the micro-
level is hard to obtain, we use a sound and statistically valid proxy — the number of 
PPP projects in infrastructure projects — instead. Accordingly, we propose some 
regressions of the “number of PPPs” variable, considered to be endogeneous, by 
using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method as well as a Poisson regression 
model and a negative binomial regression model, respectively, as they seem to be 
more suitable due to the nature of the data which appear not to completely fulfil 
OLS requirements (Long, 1997).  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Number of PPPs 724 0.00 686.00 20.35 55.39 
GNI2  80.00 11150.00 1553.64 1669.47 
VA1  -2.19 1.21 -.4484 .77632 
GovE2  -2.25 1.39 -.4830 .59855 
Bev  71079.00 1311020000.00 40541783.31 149814932.48 
Inflation  -24.00 5400.00 29.0127 254.19555 
Using the variables discussed above, we ran a cross-sectional model with data for 
up to six years and for 118 countries (unbalanced panel; see the annex for the 
complete list of countries). The descriptive statistics can be drawn from Table 1. 
Results and discussion 
As can be drawn from Table 2, the results from the different models used show a 
high degree of consistency in terms of the sign of the respective coefficient and the 
significance level. Additional tests for robustness (not displayed), using different 
indicators for institutional quality, validate the findings of the regression models 
used. In all cases, the Fisher-Test (F-test) and the omnibus-test indicate that the 
model is significant at 1 per cent level; also the goodness of fit (for the non-OLS 
models Pearson's chi-squared statistic and log-likelihood, as well as R²/R² adjusted 
for OLS) is high for the models displayed. 
The indicator Voice and Accountability (VA) displayed a significant negative 
correlation with the number of PPP projects in a country, as the coefficient is 
negative for the OLS-regression and beyond 1 for the non-OLS regressions. This 
implies that a higher degree of democratic participation inhibits partnerships with 
private enterprise and decreases the odd that a large number of PPPs exists. This 
result, at first glance, seems to be inconsistent with the theoretical explanation that 
democratic institutions will foster the implementation of PPP. On closer inspection, 
however, it can be explained through the governments’ willingness to use private 
European Journal of Government and Economics 3(2) 
114 
 
sector participation. It might be the case that democratic governments would prefer 
full privatisation because they have no fear of a loss of political control over the 
affected sector. In these cases, they will not resort to PPP solutions, but will rather 
liberalise the complete sector and open it completely to the private sector (which 
might result in a mixed economy setting of public suppliers competing with private 
firms in the same sector). On the other hand, semi-democratic or autocratic 
regimes (characterised by a relatively low value for Voice and Accountability), 
which are not willing to hand over control of vital infrastructure sectors, prefer to 
use PPP projects as opposed to full-blown privatisation.  
Table 2: Results of the regression analysis 
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Dummy South Asia (-5,474)** - - - 
Observations  714 695 695 695 
R²/R² adjusted 0,574/0,567    
T-statistics in parentheses: ** significant at 1 percent 
Sources: Author’s Compilation, data sources: World Bank PPI-Date Base, Kaufmann et al 2008. 
The indicator Government Effectiveness has, in all models, the expected positive 
sign as well as a significant impact. This result is consistent with the theoretical 
analysis from an institutional economics perspective. It also substantiates our 
assumption that the existence – or at least the perception – of a high quality of the 
public service and a highly credible bureaucracy foster the implementation of PPP. 
If the quality of the civil service and the credibility of the government’s commitment 
is high, the odd increases that PPPs are implemented. This might be caused by the 
direct signalling function of Government Effectiveness to the private sector, and to 
the international development agencies alike, which are more likely to support 
PPPs if “good” governance exists.  
While the overall macroeconomic development, proxied by economic wealth and 
the inflation rate of the respective country does not matter, the size of the country 
in terms of population does. Further studies should include this factor, whether by 
standardisation of the number of PPPs on population or through using other 
dependent variables as e.g. average investment volumes per capita. First empirical 
tests, standardizing the number of PPPs on population, nevertheless underpin the 
outcomes discussed above. Furthermore, there are significant differences between 
the regions of the World, which cannot be explained by the institutional or 
economic conditions tested for. These regional differences may be explained by 
the missing political will to include the private sector in service provision at all. Also 
“time-lags” may be an explanation, as some regions are lagging behind in terms of 
only recently opening up towards private sector participation, such that private 
companies may lack the will to invest in politically unstable regions like the Middle 
East and North Africa.  




The results of our research provide strong evidence that a significant positive 
relationship exists between the indicator Government Effectiveness and the 
number of PPP projects in a country. As PPP numbers can be used as a reliable 
proxy for the total involvement and investment of private enterprises in public 
services and infrastructure, our results can be extended to assess the overall 
impact of institutions on this kind of private sector involvement. Therefore, our 
findings stress the importance of a sound institutional framework for more private 
sector involvement, which is likely to lead to economic growth. Amongst other 
explanations, such as the lack of political will to attract private capital, a low 
institutional quality may therefore provide a powerful explanation for the lack of 
private investment in many countries. From the perspective of prospective private 
sector partners, weak institutions increase uncertainty and, as a some kind of 
“collateral damage” also the project-related transaction costs, which may thus 
explain the private sector’s lack of will or its inability to engage in PPP projects in a 
specific country. This finding is even more important against the trivial insight that 
in particular large or international private companies are able to decide relatively 
independently where to invest their resources in a PPP because of the fast growing 
demand for private capital and expertise in public services and infrastructure world-
wide.  
The creation of sound and trusted institutions, especially on the micro-level, in 
administration, to “cure” the incompleteness of public-private contracts and to 
reduce transaction costs therefore is a crucial first step to attract private enterprises 
whose investment may substantially contribute to economic growth and 
development. Therewith, our work gives some hints on a “second institutional 
channel of development” – sound institutions do not only influence foreign direct 
investment in the narrow sense, but also private sector activities in the provision of 
public services. This seems to be important as the private enterprises included in 
our study come from industrialised “foreign” countries as well as from the 
respective country itself. Improving framework conditions for both kinds of 
enterprises to invest in public infrastructure may be an important instrument of the 
political level, but also the administration itself to foster long-term growth. 
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Table A1: Countries included in the empirical Analysis 
Albania Cuba Laos Somalia 
Algeria Djibouti Lesotho South Africa 
Albania Dominica Liberia  Sri Lanka 
Angola Dominican Republic Madagascar Sudan 
Argentina East Timor Malawi Surinam 
Armenia Ecuador Malaysia Swaziland 
Azerbaijan Egypt, Arab Rep. Maldives Syria 
Bangladesh El Salvador Mali Tadzhikistan  
Belarus Eq. Guinea Mauretania Tanzania 
Belize Eritrea Mauritius Senegal 
Benin Fiji Mexico Seychelles 
Bhutan Gabon Moldavia Sierra Leone 
Bolivia Gambia Mongolia Thailand 
Botswana  Georgia Morocco Togo 
Brazil Ghana Mozambique Tonga 
Burkina Faso Grenada Namibia Tunisia 
Burundi Guatemala Nepal Turkey 
Cambodia Guinea Nicaragua Turkmenistan 
Cameroon Guyana Niger Uganda 
Cape Verde Haiti Nigeria Ukraine 
Central African Republic Honduras Oman Uruguay 
Chad India Pakistan Uzbekistan 
Chile Indonesia Panama Vanuatu 
China Iran, Islam. Rep. Papua New Guinea Venezuela 
Colombia Ivory Coast Paraguay Vietnam 
Comoros Jamaica Peru West Bank and Gaza 
Congo Jordan Philippines Yemen 
Congo, Dem. Kazakhstan Poland Zambia 
Costa Rica Kenia Russian Federation  
Colombia Kiribati Ruanda  
Comoros Kirgizstan Samoa  
